

8. The implications of conditionality in social assistance programmes

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INTRODUCTION

Social protection measures as the cornerstone of social policy in low-income countries are riding high on the international development policy agenda. This has led to a rapid increase in the number of state-led schemes aimed at alleviating chronic poverty and vulnerability in lower-income countries since the turn of the twenty-first century with a growing focus on conditionality.

International policy attention to social protection is illustrated by the ongoing UN Social Protection Floor initiative, launched in 2009, focusing attention on social protection through the UN system (ILO and OECD 2011). The focus was sharpened by the recent global financial downturn (World Bank 2009a), with social protection positioned as a key tool to help countries and households both cope with the crisis and to deliver more 'inclusive development' (European University Institute and European Commission 2010). A key policy message is that countries with established social protection systems in place were able to react more quickly to the crisis (World Bank 2010). The Bank makes use of '3P' framework of Prevention, Promotion and Protection common in discussions about social protection (World Bank 2010), though it is perhaps worth noting that others have sought to introduce a 'transformative' element into the framework (see Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler 2004) to emphasize the potential of effective social protection in empowering marginalized groups. There is therefore an increasing and welcome recognition that one-off or patchwork solutions to social protection challenges are inadequate, and that more comprehensive systems are needed.

Alongside this international focus, national and nationally designed social protection schemes have been developed in low- and middle-income countries. Characterizing them as a 'development revolution from

the Global South', Hanlon et al. (2010, p. 167) noted schemes in 45 countries covering 110 million families. Though positive, coverage of 110 million families in the global South implies that a very large number of very poor and vulnerable households are not covered. In 2001 France, Germany and the UK spent between 14.2 per cent and 17.9 per cent of GDPs on social security, compared with India (1.5 per cent), Ghana (2.1 per cent) and Kenya (0.3 per cent) of their (lower) GDPs (Townsend 2009a). A World Bank study on safety nets¹ using data from 2000 to 2004 showed that low-income countries spend on average 1.9 per cent of GDP on social assistance (Weigand and Grosh 2008).

Within this growing consensus about the importance of social protection per se, a series of interrelated and more practical questions has arisen: which groups are to be covered, how will these groups be reached, what benefits should they receive, and how will they be financed? Design issues then sit alongside political considerations which often receive little attention in technical debates (including financing and how support is to be delivered and sustained for a given scheme). Implementation and delivery concerns need to be addressed (if administrative systems are weak, how is need to be assessed and benefits distributed?).

There are different modes of delivering social protection policies in order to help reduce poverty, manage risk or replace income. Transfers tend to be categorized into social insurance, assistance and more categorical models. Insurance-based policies seek to replace income lost as a result of contingencies like old age or ill health), and have an element of prior contributions from beneficiaries. Social assistance refers to non-contributory policies, often directly aimed at poverty reduction. Some schemes also provide support to certain categories (for example, households with children or older people) usually in recognition of additional need or as a targeting method, and do so with or without an additional test of household need. These are broad distinctions since schemes often mix features of several categories. There are a number of examples of these mechanisms in developing countries; perhaps most prominent is the Child Support Grant in South Africa (Townsend 2009b). They are common in developed countries, and have considerable importance for reducing poverty rates (Bradshaw 2006), which may reflect more entrenched social provision and higher resources but also suggest a policy form (supporting families with children or with older or disabled members) regarded as an important element of the welfare contract by developed world populations.

The arguments in favour of unconditional categorical payments are that they can be relatively simple to administer, being primarily dependent on

information about household membership (testing needs is likely to cause further complexity). Further, they can be a relatively efficient and effective way of targeting those in need (since households with children tend to be poorer) whilst keeping the targeting route simple. By not adding further conditions for receiving support, the payments also have the advantage of trusting poorer people to make their own decisions about how to bring up their children.

Access to a growing number of schemes in developing countries now includes a conditional element – a major focus of this chapter. Policy-makers tend to use conditionality as a mechanism to meet objectives beyond the income needs of beneficiaries. In particular, recent debate has centred on requirements of conditional cash transfers (CCTs) that primarily target developing human capital development in children (through school attendance and health interventions). These may also serve a secondary purpose in building support for programmes by creating what may be seen as a ‘something for something’ relationship where ‘redistribution is political feasible only when conditioned on “good behaviour”’ (Fiszbein and Schady 2009, p. 11). This second justification for conditionality extends well beyond CCTs. Here we refer to the labour requirements within public works, to emphasize that these serve the dual function of employment creation and helping build public support for state intervention. Such conditions also have implications for children.

This chapter focuses on understanding the impact of conditionality within particular social protection instruments, drawing on a wider debate and citing evidence from the Young Lives longitudinal study of childhood poverty. The chapter draws substantially on Porter with Dornan (2010). We begin by considering some of the different types of schemes often used to deliver social protection, with a discussion of the conditionalities implied by each. In particular, we document the positive effects for beneficiaries but also possible unintended and negative consequences for vulnerable household members.

SOCIAL ASSISTANCE AND TYPES OF INSTRUMENTS

This section considers common types of mechanism adopted to meet social protection objectives, within the realm of social assistance (non-contributory) programmes. Within the broader focus on social protection, the question increasingly becomes not the appropriateness of social protection as an intervention by the state, but choices over the mechanisms used and how these suit objective(s) and context, together with effective implementation and sustained financing. The particular focus of

this chapter is the implications for children of conditionality decisions with respect to social assistance.

We first consider some of the different instruments typically used. We make use of a definition from a recent joint statement of social protection and its effects on children: ‘Social Protection is generally understood as a set of public actions that address poverty, vulnerability and exclusion as well as to provide means to cope with life’s major risks throughout the life cycle’ (DFID et al. 2009). Others have also argued recently for the particular importance of social protection measures for children (Handa et al. 2010). We assume that child sensitivity implies recognizing the need to think carefully about how children may experience household-based social protection measures, monitoring these effects, and adjusting policy accordingly.

Particular social assistance mechanisms are likely to vary depending on choices around several key parameters. Each choice requires trade-offs between objectives, so there is no clearly ‘right’ answer. Choices have to be made, first, about who is perceived to be in need, which will also affect the proportion of the population covered; and second, about how those targeted will be reached, including whether policymakers choose to extend entitlement to particular categories of households (for example, those with children), whether a scheme is area-based (for example, operating in only rural or poorer communities), and whether there is a test of means (perhaps judged in light of household circumstances, or through some community-based targeting mechanism). Schemes also vary with the conditions that recipients must meet, though most schemes contain some conditions (from work requirements in public works to health and education participation in typical CCTs). In many developing countries, the decisions are made in dialogue between governments and international development partners, who often finance a large proportion of social spending (for example, in Ethiopia social assistance represents 4.5 per cent of GDP, of which 4 per cent is contributed by international aid; Weigand and Grosh 2008).

CCTs have become the most prevalent type of social protection in Latin America (Rawlings and Rubio 2005). Much attention has been paid to this modality and examples such as the Mexican *Oportunidades* are well publicized. There has been some agreement in many respects that CCTs are politically more palatable as they target the ‘deserving’ poor who behave responsibly in order to receive the cash. Fiszbein and Schady (2009) summarize a large body of evidence (often generated by the World Bank) and make a strong case for CCTs as an effective poverty reduction strategy. The compelling argument is that CCTs provide both a safety net in terms of an income transfer in times of need and an

investment in human capital through the conditionality that will help to break the intergenerational cycle of poverty. The explicit paternalistic assumption is that parents need to be encouraged to make the right choices over the health and education of their children. As with public work schemes, there is a risk this reinforces existing stereotypes. Hanlon et al. (2010), for example, quote a World Bank official and author of a widely cited review of CCTs as arguing at a meeting ‘that there is a problem of “persistently misguided beliefs” [i.e. not investing in human capital development] on the part of the poor that means their children remain poor’ (2010, p. 128). This view seems to leave little room for understanding the weaknesses in the quality and availability of public services that poorer people are likely to encounter. We return to this point with empirical evidence from *Young Lives* in the following section.

It is also worth noting that it is often difficult to establish whether participation is driven by the effect of conditions or by the additional income provided through the scheme. Many evaluations have shown positive impacts on schooling and health, yet very few have actually compared a conditional transfer with an unconditional one. Rather, they have compared CCT beneficiaries with non-beneficiaries. One study managed to isolate the impact of conditionality in Mexico, due to some administrative errors that led to no conditionality being imposed on one particular group of people. The study found that school outcomes improved less for the group that was not monitored (de Brauw and Hoddinott 2008). However, a World Bank study of a programme in Malawi, using a randomized control trial (RCT) to target a subsidy to the families of adolescent girls, found that, in fact, conditionality does not reduce the probability of dropping out of school (Baird et al. 2009). However, the combination of an increase in the size of the transfer and imposing attendance conditions did improve both attendance and performance. A study of a pilot programme in Morocco reports similar findings on attendance (Benhassine et al. 2010, quoted in Banerjee and Duflo 2011, p. 80).

Hanlon et al. (2010) discuss the logical extension of CCTs to payment by results (conditioning, for example, not the use of clinics or attending school but child weight or test scores), and cite an example from Nicaragua which resulted in punishing the poorest households and encouraging perverse behaviour such as households having ‘stuffed their children with food and water on growth monitoring days to avoid penalties’ (2010, p. 132). There has also been criticism of this approach (e.g. Molyneux 2006) due to the pressure it puts on mothers; nevertheless, the popularity of CCTs is expanding quite rapidly in the African context.

Whether the paternalism implied by CCTs is more empowering in both the short term and long term is clearly somewhat contested within governments and international institutions.

CCTs both rely on the existence of a foundation of public services which households can access in order to meet conditions, and require good administrative records of participation to be kept. In principle, the existence of a CCT may help drive improvements in service quality or capacity, but both points suggest some caution in developing CCTs in lower-income countries where the public service environment may be weaker and where greater human capital improvements may be generated simply by redistributive methods.

An alternative modality with a conditional element is public works. Such schemes have a long history, in both the developed and the developing worlds. Del Ninno et al. (2009) review 20 years of evidence and show that public works have been used in response to one-off large shocks and repeated shocks, and also for poverty reduction. The main advantage of public works is arguably that participants are self-selecting, opting in themselves rather than having bureaucrats decide who is eligible. Ravallion (1991) outlines how labour-intensive rural public works projects have the potential to both screen and protect poor people, with the evidence suggesting few non-poor people want to participate,² while the direct and indirect transfer and insurance benefits to poorer people can be sizeable. Further, public works also have an element of 'beneficiary responsibility' by being conditional on the work done, and this may help make them more politically palatable as they are less likely to be seen as 'free handouts'. Equally, by running with the grain of this thinking, public works programmes fail to challenge, and may strengthen, assumptions that poorer people are somehow lazy and therefore need to be made to work, and perhaps by extension that lack of work ethic, rather than structured disadvantage, may be the explanation for their poverty (McCord 2008).

Public works are also thought to have a broader developmental impact if they create public assets (such as infrastructure); however, there is a tension between the objective of low wage rates to exclude richer groups from participation in targeted schemes and the creation of high-quality assets. McCord (2008) critically examines several problems with the use of public works as a safety net and argues that they are often used in an attempt to achieve more aims than are possible with one scheme – for example, offering one-off episodes of employment in response to structural unemployment (failure to deal with structural unemployment would therefore make graduation from such schemes difficult). In India the

Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREG) scheme is self-selecting, but in Ethiopia administrators select participants in public work, although at a decentralized level that includes community leaders, since arguably demand would otherwise be too high even at very low wage rates. This leads to differing issues in the two countries.

The next section illustrates some key issues, drawing on empirical research from the Young Lives study, a rich and growing data set containing detailed information on many aspects of the lives of almost 12,000 children in four countries.³ Since 2001, in Ethiopia, Peru, India and Vietnam children from two cohorts have been visited three times for quantitative surveys, and twice for qualitative studies. The 2,000 'index children' in each country were aged 6–18 months on the first visit, were resurveyed again at age four to five years and most recently aged seven to eight years. They will be followed until their 15th birthdays. The 'older cohort' children were aged seven to eight years in the first round of the quantitative survey, and in the third and most recent round were 15 years old.

DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES IN PUBLIC WORKS

We first discuss the impact of conditionality in terms of a work requirement on the lives of children in Ethiopia and India. MGNREGS is now the largest public works programme in the world. It came into force in 2006 with the legislative backing of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (2005). It has been welcomed as a scheme which addresses weaknesses inherent in the earlier systems and is rights-based in its language.

In Ethiopia, the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) is currently the largest public works in sub-Saharan Africa outside South Africa, and has attracted considerable policy and academic interest. The PSNP includes the provision of food or cash for work as well as direct support (DS) to poor households that are unable to participate in public works (around 20 per cent). This is complemented by the Other Food Security Program (OFSP), which provides households with access to a suite of improved agricultural technologies such as extension services, fertilizer, credit and other services (Government of Ethiopia 2004).

Some descriptive statistics on participation in MGNREGS for the Young Lives sample in 2006 show that the scheme is fairly well targeted at the poor. This echoes findings from some other studies to the effect

that lower castes and holders of Antyodaya cards⁴ were more likely to register for the programme (e.g. Jha et al. 2009; Shariff 2008). In the rural sample overall (just under 2,200 households with the two cohorts pooled), 45 per cent are participating in MGNREGS and 14 per cent worked more than ten days in the scheme. In terms of the wealth distribution in 2006, it was fairly well targeted – though with fewer participants in the bottom wealth quintile than in the second-bottom. This could be because poorer households have less labour available to work (because of disabilities or other health issues, or they may be further from a work site). In 2006 the MGNREGS scheme was still being rolled out in a limited number of districts; analysis of data from 2009 shows high coverage of job cards (four in five households in the sample). Coverage was highest for poorer households, but relatively few households were working the full 100 days possible (Galab et al. 2008, s. 5).

In the Young Lives sites in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh, using 2006 data we found that the children of participants in both cohorts were significantly shorter than those of non-participants, which is a sign of long-term differences in nutrition. This could be an indicator that the participant households were poorer in the past, and thus that targeting is working. We do not find significant differences in between the two groups in per capita consumption or in school enrolment. By contrast, in the Ethiopia sample there are actually not many significant differences between PSNP participants and non-participants, which is partly due to the extremely low levels of consumption in the whole of Ethiopia. In fact, only household size is different (with participants coming from slightly smaller households). In terms of the wealth distribution, participation is quite similar in all of the wealth quintiles (as defined by an index of assets and services available to households).

In both India and Ethiopia, there is quantitative and qualitative evidence that households participating in public works benefit from it in terms of child outcomes, but that participation brings extra work responsibilities to children. Uppal (2009) finds different processes determining the incidence of child labour (which is defined in this case as paid work) among boys and that among girls as a result of MGNREGS. For boys, the incidence of drought seems to increase the likelihood of work by 14.8 per cent, while registration for the scheme has a negative effect that counteracts this, reducing the likelihood of work by 13.4 per cent, suggesting the scheme serves an insurance purpose. For girls, being in a rural area increases the chances of child labour by 10.1 per cent. However, girls in households taking up work under the scheme are 8.2 per cent less likely to participate in other paid work. This could be

because of the income effect or, alternatively, because girls are substituting for household members in other activities such as on the household land or in housekeeping. Additionally, children of farmers with small plots have been shown to increase their workload if their parents can no longer afford to employ labourers (Morrow and Vennam 2010).

MGNREGS programme design includes the presence of child care facilities at all sites where more than five children under the age of six are present, a move especially important given that MGNREGS requires at least 33 per cent of beneficiaries to be women (Government of India 2008). This does not, however, seem to be reflected in the data, with only 8.7 per cent of registered respondents reporting the availability of childcare centres on site (Uppal 2009). Woldehanna (2009) examined hours of paid and unpaid work, domestic chores, schooling and childcare of 11–12 year olds in Young Lives Ethiopia. He finds that the public works component (PWP) of the PSNP increased the amount of time both girls and boys spent on paid work. However, it reduced the amount of time girls spent on childcare and housekeeping. The net effect was that children's total hours of work were reduced. The PWP also increased the time girls spent studying. Woldehanna also found that the Direct Support component (DSP) of the PSNP reduced child work in paid and unpaid activities and increased the grades completed by boys in both rural and urban areas. In rural areas, boys' hours of unpaid work outside the home and girls' hours of childcare and housekeeping declined. In urban areas, girls' hours of paid work and boys' hours of paid and unpaid work declined significantly. The DSP was found to increase the grades completed by boys in both rural and urban areas.⁵

Emirie et al. (2009), using qualitative methods in a subset of Young Lives sites, found that, as a result of income they receive from PSNP, participants in PSNP have started to send their children to school instead of sending them to rich farmers for farm wage employment. Members of some PSNP households, including children, are involved in other income-generating activities like collecting and selling cow dung to fill the income gap that is not covered by PSNP and farm earnings. This has particularly been the case in those sites where payment has been in cash rather than in food due to food price rises. Given the poor market and rising prices, almost all beneficiaries preferred PSNP payment in kind rather than in cash.

Respondents mentioned instances of labour substitution where they saw children (both boys and girls) carrying out domestic chores while their parents were away on safety-net work. In fact, some clearly felt that the labour demands of the PSNP mean that children need to sacrifice their time and energy for domestic work instead of studying or playing.

Furthermore, the practice of children labouring on public works was followed in at least three of the four research sites: Amhara, Oromia and SNNPR.⁶ Also, some respondents, including teachers, stated that PSNP activities and increased household demand for child labour (as substitutes in domestic or public works) have negatively affected children's educational participation and performance.

CONDITIONS IN CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS

We contrast these findings with those on conditional cash transfers, drawing on evidence from Peru. We note that Peru is classified as 'upper-middle income' in development terms; it has a significantly higher average national income than Ethiopia or India,⁷ and has also higher inequality (World Bank 2009b). Within the Latin American region, however, Peru has performed economically less well than the average, and has higher levels of poverty and lower human development achievements than many other countries in the region. The number of people covered by (non-contributory) social assistance programmes in 2002 was high, but benefits were low (see below for specific information on Juntos, which was introduced in 2005). This is partly because Peru has a smaller tax base than average for the region, but spending on social assistance was also low in comparison even with health and education.

Peru's Juntos ('Together') programme is a CCT scheme, introduced in 2005, which currently covers around 430,000 households in 638 districts, making it the largest social programme in Peru.⁸ The key objectives are to reduce poverty and increase human capital (as with most CCT programmes). The monitoring of Juntos (after the introduction of the programme) has been conducted by a number of donors in collaboration with government agencies,⁹ and thus far it has not been subject to the charges of corruption and cronyism that have been levelled at other programmes in Peru.

Eligible households in Juntos receive 100 soles (around 30 US dollars) per month, regardless of household size. This is relatively modest compared with other similar programmes in the region. The conditionalities attached to the programme depend on the age of children: those under five years must attend regular health and nutrition checks (including for height and weight monitoring, vaccinations, parasite checks and vitamin supplements); children aged 6–14 years with incomplete primary education must attend school for at least 85 per cent of the year; pregnant/breastfeeding mothers must undergo a series of pre- and post-natal checks (including for vaccinations, vitamin supplements and parasite checks). Health campaigns

are also operating in eligible regions, including sanitation and nutrition programmes.

As long as they comply with these conditions, families are eligible to receive the cash transfer for up to eight years; the full 100 soles a month during the first four years, and a reduced transfer in the final four years. The cash transfer is suspended for three consecutive months in the case of non-compliance and indefinitely if non-compliance is repeated. Every three months, Juntos local promoters are scheduled to visit the homes of beneficiaries to monitor their compliance, information that should be cross-checked with school attendance and health-care visit records.¹⁰ According to the Juntos 2007 Annual Assessment, 95 per cent of beneficiary families complied with what it called 'health-related' conditionalities, 97 per cent ensured that their children attend school regularly, and 99 per cent participated in the National Nutritional Assistance Programme for children under the age of three (Juntos 2008).

A recent World Bank study (Perova and Vakis, 2009) found that Juntos reduces the depth of income poverty and increases food consumption (though it brings few households over the poverty line because the transfer is relatively small). Children in Juntos were less likely to have experienced illness in the month prior to the survey. Juntos beneficiaries more frequently sought medical attention for their under-fives in the event of illness, had more vaccinations and attended more health controls.

Qualitative studies in Young Lives communities have found effects that echo the World Bank quantitative study cited above, but add more depth on both intra-household and social dynamics in communities. Alcazar (2010) finds that considerable impacts can be attributed to Juntos, such as improved school attendance, especially for girls (and particularly in the last year of primary school), as well as improved attendance and performance of teachers.

Streuli (2009) finds that, even though children and parents recognize that the programme aims to benefit families living in poverty, they observed targeting errors and leaks. For example, a beneficiary girl said that 'some families appear with someone else's child' so as to fulfil the selection criteria. Parents also observed that the programme is supporting both 'poor' people and those who are 'not so poor'. Alcazar (2010) notes that a large number of women receiving the benefit seemed unclear about the conditions for their receiving the benefit, and there were some instances of communities being disgruntled due to perceived errors in within-community targeting.

Juntos's targeting process appears to have had a less positive impact on community dynamics. In a context of general poverty, when some

families are included and others not and there is insufficient clarity about the reasons for this, the introduction of the programme has generated feelings of sadness, resentment and anger among some community members. Especially in the initial stages, the programme suffered from a number of weaknesses in identifying beneficiaries. Streuli (2009) finds that Juntos's emphasis on 'human capital' may be undermining people's 'social capital' and other crucial aspects such as participation, choice and power in decision-making. There are tensions between Juntos and non-Juntos families – non-beneficiaries believe that Juntos families are dishonest in their efforts to obtain the benefits and lazy as a result of participating. Some non-Juntos children are singled out for discrimination. This is of particular concern given that the areas where Juntos is being targeted have a long history of political violence and community tensions. Streuli does not, however, conclude that the community effects are solely negative. In some cases, the programme has also generated a feeling of solidarity among the beneficiaries, who seek to share with those who do not receive the cash transfers but who are obviously impoverished.

The evidence from Young Lives suggests that Juntos is 'child-oriented' but not yet child-centred; that is, the programme needs to fully recognize children equally, and not simply as passive recipients of services. From a policy point of view there is an important question about whether it is service improvement or conditionalities which drive improved service engagement, given that the answer ought to determine policy development.

CONCLUSION

Empirical evidence of social assistance programmes from a child's viewpoint show positive impacts on children. Public works schemes in India act as a cushion, which possibly proves the existence of insurance effects. There are particular benefits when drought hits the welfare of households; the poorest households benefit from this, including those of lower castes, but those of scheduled castes¹¹ are less likely to participate. In Ethiopia, we find that schooling outcomes are improved by certain components of the Productive Safety Net Programme, though there are different impacts on boys and girls. In Peru there is evidence that conditional cash transfers are mainly reaching the intended beneficiaries by providing a welcome boost to the poorest, as well as improving their capacity to attend school and the attendance and performance of their teachers.

However, research has also uncovered some of the unintended consequences of social protection for children. While children in Peru are attending school, there are concerns that increased demands on schools (through increases in class size) have not been adequately matched by investment in schools. While the inclusion of children with different needs is to be welcomed, this should be accompanied by the training of educators. There is also evidence from Peru, based on views that have been expressed by children and their communities in Young Lives sites, that programme placement has introduced some tensions into the community. A finding of particular significance from Young Lives research is that public works have both an income transfer and a household labour requirement; in India and Ethiopia household participation in public works may increase labour demands on children, possibly in different ways for girls and boys and for older and younger children. Since public works programmes by definition seek to increase the amount of work available, and since work is a daily reality for many children, it is perhaps unsurprising that these schemes increase the amount of work some children undertake (for instance, in housekeeping or other work that would have previously been undertaken by adults now working in the scheme). Boyden (2009), however, notes that work should not always be viewed as a risk. If supported and valued it can act as a protective mechanism. Combining work with school can be part of building child and family resilience. However, if work undermines schooling and/or a stigma is attached to work, this can increase children's vulnerability and distress.

Overall, child-focused research on social protection can provide important insights that can make social protection more inclusive of children's needs. This can improve programme design so as to make better use of scarce resources, and invest in the future of children in very poor communities. We conclude, therefore, that well-designed social protection has a major role to play in improving children's life chances. There is, however, a risk of unintended consequences within social protection, especially when conditions apply to beneficiaries. Such effects have important intra-household and gendered dimensions that must be incorporated within the policy design process. Finally, social protection schemes operate in a context, and policymakers need to consider both the schemes themselves and how other economic and social policies are able to foster graduation beyond social protection.

NOTES

1. Safety nets are also referred to as social assistance, or non-contributory transfers, in contrast with social insurance schemes.
2. A principle elsewhere named 'less eligibility' used to justify the harsh and demeaning conditions of the British workhouse to avoid the risk that anyone other than the desperate made use of them (see Brundage 2002, p. 54). In short, this argument, by definition, argues for social provision but set at a very low level of generosity.
3. See www.younglives.org.uk for data documentation, links to questionnaires and data sets, and technical notes describing sampling and methodology. The study is core-funded by UKAID from the Department for International Development (DFID) and the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
4. Households that are entitled to subsidized rations of food – a measure of destitution in India.
5. These results should be treated with caution given that the PSNP was both new in 2005 and in many cases replacing participation in one of the previous food or cash-for-work or transfer schemes.
6. Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Region.
7. Peru's GNP per capita is over ten times that of Ethiopia as measured with current US dollars (World Bank 2010). There is an ongoing discussion on the merits of various comparison mechanisms between countries, but the difference in development terms overall (and especially in large urban areas) is clear. It is also notable that though Peru's per capita GDP is higher than those of the other countries, high levels of inequality mean there is much less of a difference in absolute poverty between Peru and Vietnam.
8. www.juntos.gob.pe, accessed 17 March 2010. Note also that approximately 20,000 households are suspended for conditionality reasons and around 60,000 others are in process.
9. World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), Grupo de Análisis para el Desarrollo (GRADE), Consorcio de Investigación Económica y Social (CIES), Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas (MEF), Ministerio de Salud del Perú (MINSA), Ministerio de Educación (MINEDUC) and Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática (INEI).
10. But see below for qualitative evidence that these conditions are often not met.
11. 'Scheduled Caste' is a term used in the Indian Constitution since 1950 to specify those castes that are scheduled to receive economic and social protection, previously known as 'backward castes'. See several Young Lives papers that explore issues of caste in the sample under consideration here.

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